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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores a suggestion from a New Zealand High Court judge that a distinction 
should be drawn between fictional and non-fictional character merchandising when a Court 
is faced with the question of whether or not protection should be granted in any given case. 
The paper is based on the assumption that there is tremendous commercial advantage to be 
obtained by traders who utilise the names, reputations and images of both real and fictional 
characters to market thei,: products to the extent that their commercial exploitation does 
merit some protection. 
Jn assessing the validity of the suggested distinction the writer examines the theoretical bases 
for the protection of char le.J::.-mere-handising and explores the workings of three ' models' 
currently used by different jurisdictjons in their approach to the p__rotection o character 
merchandising dghts-=-one which does not require the drawing of a distinction, one whic 
- clearly draws a distinction on the basis of whether the particular character is a natural 
person or not, and one ~hich is essentially undeveloped but which recognises that policy 
dictates that there should be a distinction drawn at some level. 
The writer submits that an approach which requires there to be an initial distinction drawn 
when deciding whether or not the particular character merchandising in question should be 
protected, should be adopted for the purposes of New Zealand law. Any 'misappropriation 
test' like the one currently utilised for the purposes of a passing off action in Australia has 
the effect of providing protection purely on the basis that something has been 
misappropriated and traditionally the law has provided little protection for this. Some other 
social or economic justification must be provided before such protection can be afforded A 
direct consequence of this approach is to endow proprietary rights in the 'owners' of 
fictional characters, and in some instances, real characters when they would normally not 
derive protection, and where no policy consideration justifies this. The writer submits that 
any approach where no distinction is required is, therefore, fundamentally inconsistent with 
the precepts of New Zealand law and with acceptable principle. 
While the writer submits that current intellectual property legislation should be tailored to 
more adequately meet the demands of character merchandising, New Zealand law should 
continue to take a conservative approach to the extended passing off action and should, when 
appropriate, adopt the American approach to the protection of personality merchandising 
such as to recognise that a right to publicity exists independently of the tort action. 
Undoubtedly there are issues still to be resolved as to the 'ownership' of the rights, and to 
exactly where a distinction should be drawn given that a blurring of the line will occur where 
a real person plays a fictional character, however the writer submits that these can only 
really be fleshed out when the Courts are confronted with more cases on the issue, and, 
given the growing popularity of the practice, this should not be far off 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 14, 359 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
One of the current major thrusts for the sale of goods and services is the practice of 
character merchandising, a multi-billion dollar industry world-wide involving the 
"marketing of goods and services that embody or are connected to actual or fictional 
characters or the marketing of things whose association with any of such goods and 
services is likely to enhance their popularity and saleability". 1 The commercial 
pulling power of endorsement by association with the famous or the fictional is 
enormous and this has led to the development of extensive licensing arrangements to 
license the names and likenesses of both fictional and non-fictional characters. 
As widespread as the practice is, traditionally the law has provided little protection 
against the "appropriation" of the creative efforts of another or even against the 
invasion of a person's right to privacy and publicity by the unauthorised invocation of 
his or her name. ·Fictional characters and a product's associated "image" are not ..,.-
legally protectable interests per se. However, character merchandising practices have, 
more recently, derived protection as special heads of protected interests under both 
the statutory intellectual property regimes and at common law. Essentially it has been 
the tort of passing off which has developed most significantly in res.12onse to the 
difficult issue of whether or not there should be some property right in names, 
reputation and images for character merchandising purposes. In some jurisdictions, 
passing off has been so generously adapted to protect both real and artificial character 
merchandising that New Zealand judges have begun to question whether "it is really 
necessary to force. the square peg of character merchandising into the round hole of 
passing off. "2 
1N R Shapiro, "Don't Toy Around, A Look at Character Merchandising" IPJ 85,87. 
2Tot Toys Limited v Mitchel/[1993] NZLR 325, 363 
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Fortunately Fisher J in Tot Toys Limited v Mitche!l3 has recognised that the time has 
come to recognise that what should be of the utmost importance in any character 
merchandising case is whether the particular character merchandising in question 
should be protected by the law, whether traditional causes of action are sufficient and, 
if not, whether a generous adaptation of passing off would achieve the desired result. 
In doing so he has gone as far as to suggest that in answering those questions there 
should be a close scrutiny of competing policy reasons underlying the need for 
protection for the particular character merchandising in question. He suggests that one 
should begin immediately by drawing a distinction between the promotional use of 
names, reputations and images of real person and artificial character merchandising. 
This paper attempts to explore Fisher J's suggestion that the law should recognise a 
distinction between fictional and non-fictional character merchandising and afford 
different types and extent of protection against unauthorised use depending upon the 
nature of the character. Part II explores the nature of the practice in general 
commercial terms. Part III provides some background material necessary for an 
assessment of the validity of Fisher J's suggested distinction. In doing so it examines 
the theoretical bases for the protection of 'characters' and provides an overview of the 
current legal mechanisms for protection for both fictional and non fictional character 
merchandising in New Zealand, Australia and the United States in order to 
demonstrate that in New Zealand to some extent, a distinction is already recognised. 
The section focuses more specifically on the development of the tort of passing off in 
response to the issue of the need to provide protection and it also considers issues 
arising from this. Part IV examines the validity of Fisher J's suggested distinction 
more explicitly, considering the issues for the validity of such a distinction, policy 
rationale in search of a justification for it and limits which should be placed on 
potential remedies for the purposes of New Zealand law. Part V concludes. The paper 
seeks primarily to. raise issues rather than to attempt postulate possible solutions to 
them, and the writer submits that this is justified given the conceptual difficulties 
3Aboven2; (1992)23 IPR337. 
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involved with this area of law and the enormous uncertainty of the current legal 
position in New Zealand. 
The writer does, however, submit that numerous factors suggest that a distinction 
should be drawn in any character merchandising case such that real and fictional 
characters should be treated separately when considering whether the particular 
character merchandising in question should be protected. The names, reputations and 
images of both 'fictional' and 'real' characters are extremely valuable to traders who 
utilise them to market goods or services and their commercial exploitation, therefore, 
does merit some protection. However, the writer submits that because of the fact that 
the images of real persons and fictional characters can develop in very different ways, 
and because differ~nt legal and policy issues are raised depending upon the nature of 
the character in question in many cases the types and extent of protection should, 
justifiably, differ. 
II CHARACTER MERCHANDISING IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Character Merchandising- The Practice 
Character Merchandising is a generic term for any form of advertising which relies on 
some "primary medium of popularity"4, whether it be a real or fictional character, an 
image or a name to promote consumer goods or services . 5 Tremendous commercial 
advantage may be obtained by the use of celebrities and other well-known characters 
in the marketing and advertising of a product. The benefits that may arise from 
merchandising, licensing contracts and endorsements can potentially yield an income 
far greater and longer lasting than the primary fields in which public recognition of 
the character were achieved. For the 'real character' public or media attention via 
4J Adams, 'Merchandising Intellectual Property' (1987) Journal of Business Law 363. 
5G Hobbs, 'Passing Off and the Licensing of Merchandising Rights', (1980) European Intellectual 
Property Review 4 7. 
4 
advertising provides a secondary avenue of income for those who contract the use of 
their public profile to endorse a product. 
Thus, with each unauthorised use of the image or personality in product endorsement, 
the value to the creator of the fictional character and to the celebrity is reduced both 
by virtue of lost royalties and further, by the ability to profit. 6 
There are three categories of trader to which those who use the term 'character 
merchandising' mean to refer. First, there is the manufacturer and promoter who 
produces goods and services with which, as part of that business, he or she associates 
images of a character or characters, real or fictional, which make the goods more 
attractive to potential purchasers. Secondly, there is the trader engaged in marketing 
his or her personality. Thirdly there is the image marketer, the trader who is engaged 
solely with the commercial exploitation of an image, or more often several. The 
image marketer is usually, although not exclusively, the owner of copyright in 
drawings or other intellectual property rights of a character7 or one who trades in the 
name which he or she is seeking to market. 8 As Elmslie and Lewis have recognised, 
often these three roles, or two of them are merged. 9 
Besides there bein~ three categories of trader, there are four broad types of ' character' 
that the character merchandiser may utilise to promote the particular goods or 
services. First, there is the 'real' or ' natural' character such that the merchandising 
may be referred to as 'personality merchandising' . This involves the real character in 
its 'natural' state. It should be acknowledged that there is potential difficulty in 
deducing to what · extent the real person's image is natural and not created when 
considering this type of character. This gives rise to a potential second category of 
6 'The more exploited, the less sought after the image or celebrity will be'. 
7For example. Ninja Turtle cartoon characters as in Mirage Studios and Others v Counter-Feat 
Clothing Co. Ltd and Another [1991] FSR 145. 
8Lyngstad & Others v Anabas Products Ltd and Another [1977] FSR 62. 
9M Elms lie and M Lewis, 'Passing Off and Image Marketing in the UK' [ 1992] 8 EIPR 270. 
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character - the real person whose 'natural image' is, to some extent, 'created' without 
the particular person losing their identity. Thirdly, there is the fictional character 
played by a real person. Many celebrities create public recognition not only in their 
"natural appearance" but more particularly in their portrayal of particular fictional 
characters. An example of this is the use of Paul Hogan's image as 'Mick Dundee' in 
the Crocodile Dundee films to advertise shoes. ((Obviously there is very substantial 
publicity value in these character roles which can be just as valuable as a celebrity's 
natural likeness.(Fourthly, there are fictional cartoon-type characters and caricatures, 
toys and screen characters. For the purposes of this paper the term -11._ctiona 
character' is used to refer to both cartoon-type characters and artificial characters 
played by real people. Similarly, it should be recognised that references to 'real 
characters' are, in some instances, deemed to include the real person in their 'natural' 
capacity and the real person playing a fictional character. 
Whichever type of character merchandising the advertiser chooses to adopt, the vital 
element of the practice is the use of the reputation of the 'character'. It is the 
association of a product with a well known 'character' that influences consumers' 
perceptions. The character's image is usually evoked in the promotion by some form 
of direct or indirect reference to the character's name, appearance, sound or 
description such that the manner in which an association may be created between a 
product and that reputation is potentially unlimited. 10 
For example, where a celebrity is used there may or may not be a connection between 
the personality and the products they are promoting. Product endorsement ranges 
from actual support of the product to a mere association or connection with the 
product ("subliminal effect"). Support of the product may be by virtue of a 
professional or occupational link 11 The motive behind such advertising is the express 
or implied professional knowledge and expertise portrayed to the public. The 
1°For example, in Tot Toys, above n 2 , the image is that of a toy identified by name and appearance as 
a "Buzzy Bee". 
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endorser does not actually need to state it is the best product as the association might 
imply this. Either way the connection of a product with a well known 'character' can 
boost revenue and give the product being promoted an advantage over and above the 
competition. 
Examples of the practice include Jonah Lomu's endorsement of Reebok sports 
goods, John Cleese as Basil Fawlty, the merchandising of playful children's toys (for 
example Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles and Muppet dolls), rock bands merchandising 
T-shirts and the selling of products by way of commemoration. Actors and actresses, 
singers and sports celebrities, and caricatures are often seen on television and in 
magazines promoting various products. While the practice takes several different 
forms and works in a multitude of ways, the common denominator is the fact that the 
'reputation' of the character is used as the lever to encourage consumers to buy .12 
III THE VALIDITY OF A DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'REAL' 
AND 'FICTIONAL' CHARACTERS 
A Theoretical Basis for the Protection of Character Merchandising 
As has been alluded to, character merchandising exploits the fact that modem buying 
habits are highly responsive to image related advertising and therefore the rights to 
use a personality or character are extremely valuable. From a legal perspective, 
therefore, the key to successful character merchandising is the possession of a 
property right in the intangible value sought to be protected. The essential issue in the 
character merchandising area is whether the "owner" of a character is entitled to the 
11 For example, a racing car driver and motor oil or a hairdresser and shampoo. 
12B F Katekar, 'Coping with Character Merchandising - Passing Off Unsurpassed' (1996) AIPJ 178, 
179. 
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exclusive use of any association with that character whatsoever, or if rights are to be 
bestowed on the "owner", whether they should be limited in some way. 13 
While the reputation may be said to "belong" to the "owner" of the character, this 
does not provide an adequate reason to block any unauthorised use of the character's 
image by another per se. Traditionally, the law has been reluctant to protect against 
any appropriation of one's creative efforts on the basis that not all appropriations are 
harmful. The decision to prevent the unauthorised use of a character, therefore, goes 
to the very foundations of intellectual property law as before protection can rightly 
be afforded, it is necessary to establish some economic or social justification for such 
protection. 
This paper explores the issue in the CC:lntext of examining whether different policy 
considerations apply which justify the drawing of a distinction between fictional and 
non-fictional character merchandising. 
Some of the general principles governing the endowment of proprietary rights in 
respect of a character deserve to be canvassed. In assessing the validity of a 
distinction between real and fictional characters it is important to recognise that these 
general principles must be delicately balanced in any given case in order to determine 
the extent of protection deserved given that judges are reluctant to grant protection 
against the mere appropriation of one's creative efforts, the policy reason's for which 
become apparent in the analysis which follows. 
Libling 14 has moot~d that the following formula should be used to determine whether 
property exists in the name or image associated with a character: "any expenditure of 
mental or physical effort, as a result of which there is created an entity, whether 
tangible or intangible, vests in the person who brought the entity into being, a 
13Above n 12, 181. 
14 'The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles' (1978) 94 LQR 103. 
8 
proprietary right to the commercial exploitation of that entity, which right is separate 
and independent from the ownership of that entity". In the absence of any general 
proprietary right in knowledge or information or any general action for unfair 
competition in New Zealand, however, the question of whether the "owner" of a 
character is able to prevent use by another of that character will depend upon whether 
that use infringes the owner's rights under a recognised area of intellectual property 
law. Thus, as stated above, before a "character", of whatever nature, is afforded 
protection by the law, an economic or social justification for protection must be 
established. 
1 Interests of the "owner" of the character 
The argument that affording protection against any unauthorised use of a character 
provides lucrative returns for its creator is circular in that a creator makes no money 
unless protection is afforded. 
It is submitted, however, that persons who have built up a reputation, with their own 
character or perhaps through a fictitious character, film or event, have a material 
interest in protecting the integrity of that reputation. Fundamentally, if a person has 
built up a business and has "goodwill" associated with that business, then his or her 
continued ability to conduct that business will depend on others being prevented from 
usurping that goodwill. Such behaviour by other traders is essentially anti-
competitive. Character Merchandising has, arguably, added an additional dimension 
to that goodwill and to the interest of the person maintaining the integrity of it for if 
the character is seen as endorsing too many products then its credibility is diminished 
as these impressions may raise doubts about the skill, expertise and reputation of that 
• 
9 
character in its chosen field. In this way false endorsements seriously prejudice the 
goodwill of the "owner" of the character which he or she has originally built up.
15 
Additional considerations apply to the 'real' character. One strong argument, 
particularly in favour of the protection of personality rights, is the right of a natural 
person to prevent the unauthorised publication of his or her image. As is outlined 
below, in the United States, if the character is a natural person then specific 
considerations apply. Each person an inherent "right of publicity", and is entitled to 
control the commercial use of his or her identity, where such right is not 
countervailed by free speech or free press. Such a right is infringed when a defendant, 
without permission, uses some aspect of the identity or persona of the plaintiff in such 
a way that the plaintiff is identifiable from the defendant's use. The cause of action is 
established if the plaintiff can show that the defendant's use is likely to cause damage 
to the commercial value of that person. 16 The social basis of the "right to publicity" 
lies in the inherent right of privacy of each individual. Correspondingly, a celebrity 
has natural rights associated with the commercial exploitation of his or her image. No 
such right exists in New Zealand or Australia17 although it does in Canada.
18 Fisher J 
in TotToys has suggested that there may well be a case for developing a cause of 
action along the lines of the American 'right to publicity', in New Zealand, and in 
doing so expressly recognises that this could have no bearing on rights with respect to 
fictional images. 19 
Q ssues in relation to privacy and proprietary rights in personality are never at issue in 
cases involving fictional characters of the cartoon or caricature type. However in 
15S Ricketson, 'Character Merchandising in Australia: Its Benefits and Burdens' (1990) l IPJ 206. 
16McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (3rd ed) Ch 28. 
17Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman v South Down Press Pty Ltd ,Unreported, Fed Court of Australia, 
Gray J 23 March 1993. 
18 A right of publicity for the purposes of character merchandising has been called for in Australia ; 
Howell, 'Personality Rights : A Canadian Perspective', paper presented at the Ninth Commonwealth 
Law Conference. 
19 Above n , 363. 
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cases ~ here a h~haracter merges with the created fictional character the courts 
cannot view 'real' ·characters and 'fictional' characters separately. ::> 
It is submitted that the fact that different policy considerations relating to the 
interests of the 'owner' of the character come in to play when the character in 
question is a 'real person' or a real person merged with a fictional character as 
opposed to when the character is artificially created, this goes some way towards 
supporting the idea that there must be a distinction drawn between the type of 
character in question in any given case before a decision is made as to whether or not 
the particular character merchandising should be protected. 
2 'Competition ' and ' innovation ' 
There is more to consider than simply the owner of the reputation. For example, 
courts are hesitant to confer rights on the owner of a character such as to create a 
monopoly for that competition is in the best interests of society is an entrenched 
common law presumption2° Competitors must be allowed to compete. Sometimes 
products are introduced in a market which are slavish imitations of other established 
products and although the products may be clearly represented to be from a different 
source, they have the appeal because of the association in the minds of consumers 
with the original; "authentic" product. In general, where copyright, design or 
trademark rights are not infringed, this behaviour is acceptable provided there is no 
misrepresentation or deception of the public. 
Another consideration is the maxim that while competition is important to economic 
growth, so is innovation and numerous intellectual property laws are the result of a 
desire to encourage innovation. The argument is that, if the law will protect an 
innovation by granting a monopoly in respect of it, and therefore making it valuable, 
people will be encouraged to innovate. However, in character merchandising 
11 
situations the cogency of this factor, it is submitted, vanes according to the 
circumstances. For example, despite the considerable value of character 
merchandising rights, it is problematic to argue that people such as Madonna or 
Michael Jackson would be discouraged from entering the music industry because they 
were unable to merchandise the rights associated with their image. However it would 
be fair to say that since merchandising has grown professional sport has become a 
more lucrative business for the participants and this encouragement has prompted 
more people to move into professional sports to the general enjoyment of the public. 
Thus, granting a 'monopoly' to the creator of a character on the basis of Libling's 
assertion that any entity generated by the expenditure of skill, effort and expertise by 
a person should be afforded proprietary rights must be balanced against the economic 
and social needs of "free competition." When considering whether a character 
merchandiser's rights are unlawfully prejudiced, it is necessary to balance several 
factors. One is the interests of the owner of the character in maintaining the integrity, 
and value of the reputation and for the real character this involves maintaining their 
inherent right to privacy. Against this must be considered the rights of consumers not 
to be subjected to misrepresentations, and the crucial premise that traders must be 
given freedom to compete with established traders. Underlying these factors are the 
assumptions of 'competition', the desire to encourage innovation, moral rights and 
freedom of expression. These policy considerations will be revisited below when the 
validity of a distinction between real and fictional characters is more fully explored. 
B The Current Legal Context of Character Merchandising- Three 
Models 
In order to gain a full appreciation of the significance and, to some extent, validity of 
Fisher J's suggestion for a distinction between the promotional use of real persons 
20Wyman, 'Competition and the Law' (1902] AC 731 
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and fictional characters it is necessary to examine the current legal context for the 
protection of character merchandising rights. This goes some way towards 
demonstrating that endowing proprietary rights in characters without recognising a 
distinction between the different 'types' of characters ultimately leads to a serious 
undermining of many of the current statutory and common law intellectual property 
regimes and to the creation of an imbalance between the competing policy 
considerations outlined above. 
As a means of assessing the validity of such a distinction three models are explored 
and their explanatory power assessed. First the mechanisms available to the character 
merchandiser in New Zealand are examined. Because the area has not been 
thoroughly litigated the paper then considers the extent of protection in other 
jurisdictions; first ·in Australia and secondly in the United States. This enables the 
writer to postulate reasons for why a distinction between the types of character in 
issue is both valid and necessary for the protection of character merchandising rights 
in New Zealand. 
1 'The New Zealand Model' 
Currently New Zealand law operates in a variety of ways to enable those holding 
rights in fictional characters, and to some extent, personalities to protect their 
merchandising value. To a certain extent a crude distinction, at one level, between 
real and fictional characters is already recognised as an examination of the extent of 
protection in New Zealand reveals. The intellectual property protection available to 
character merchandisers is, however, piecemeal and uncertain because to date there is 
minimal authority on the issue of protection. It is a case of the aggrieved celebrity or 
"owner" or creator of a fictional character endeavouring to fit his or her case within 
one or more of a series of quite unrelated causes of action. 
13 
Aside from the tort of passing off, the most important laws in New Zealand are the 
Copyright Act 1994, the Trade Marks Act 1956 and the consumer _protection - --- -- -provisions of the Fair .Irading Act 1986. The licensing of personal reputation is 
something :~in the law for _....... u~stions ise as !9 whether licensing 
contrac.,,.,t __ for the provision of the personality's services or for the licensing of an 
"--
intellectual proper!)' right. The <22mmercial reality is that reputation is a tradable -commodity, but legally no property right exists in reputation per se. 
(a) Copyright 
Although both real and fictional characters give rise to merchandising activity, far 
superior legal protection is given to those from fiction because copyright law, by 
reason of its very nature and philosophical underpinnings, is able to protect and 
reward the creative endeavour that goes into the creation of such a character. This is 
particularly in respect of drawings, photographs and other depictions of characters 
that fall within the definitions of "literary" and "artistic" works in the Copyright Act 
1994. For example, Agatha Christie's detective Miss Marple's name and features are 
enshrined in a "literary work", Disney cartoons will be "artistic works" and puppets 
or models from The Muppet Show will be works of "artistic craftsmanship". All of 
these types of works gain copyright protection for a finite period of at least 50 years.
21 
Such protection dearly has the effect of protecting both the works itself and its 
author's exploitation of that work, and future authors who come up with future similar 
characters may be in breach of the original author's copyright. However, copyright 
will not protect the reputation or goodwill created by a character. 
As copyright protects the form of an idea and not the idea itself a plaintiff must show 
there has been a substantial reproduction of the original work by the copyist.
22 
21 Copyright Act 1994. 
22In King Features Syndicate Inc v Kleeman Limited [ 1941] A C 417 the owner of copyright in Popeye 
cartoons obtained an injunction to restrain the importation and sale of Popeye dolls and brooches 
which were three dimensional copyright drawings. It was held that the brooches and dolls were 
14 
In relation to fictional characters other than cartoon characters, copyright exists in the 
works in which the character appears and not in the character itself as the character 
cannot be classified as a "literary" or "dramatic" work. A character removed from a 
story, therefore, becomes difficult to define and falls into the grey area between the 
protected concrete expression of an idea and the unprotected idea itself.
23 Further, as 
copyright protection only prevents actual copying there is a problem where the 
character emerges from the context of a whole literary work (which may give rise to 
certain ideas and associations with the character). Copyright will not protect against 
the adoption of a theme, idea or image that, in the context of a television 
advertisement, for example, will be no less effective in generating an association 
between a character and a product. 
Copyright law provides little protection for real characters given that judges have 
generally been reluctant to recognise copyright in names on the basis that they are too 
insubstantial to qualify as literary works.24 Further, no matter how famous or well 
infringements even though the plaintiff could not say which one precisely. The inferences of copying 
were made from the similarity between the dolls and brooches and a particular sketch. 
23Two tests for determining if there is copyright in a " character" in the United States are ; (1) the two-
stage development test that Learned Hand espoused in Nichols v Universal Pictures 282 US 902 
(1931) being (a) the character must be well developed or highly delineated and (b) the alleged 
infringer must copy the development or delineation not merely some broader more abstract outline; 
and (2) the "story being told" test in Warner Eros Pictures v Columbia Broadcasting 216 F 2d 945 
(9the Cert 1954), 348 US 971 (1955) - a character wil receive no copyright protection unless it 
constitues a "story being told" and not merely "a chess piece in the game of telling the story" . 
240n the basis that th~y are too insubstantial to qualify as literary works (for example, " Kojak" or 
" The Wombles" where no copyright was found to exist despite their fame) Taverner Rutledge v 
Trexapalm [1977) RPL 275 and Wombles v Wombles Skip [1974) 99.The case of Exxon Corporation v 
Exxon Insurance Consultants International Limited [ 1981] 1 WLR 624 suggests that an invented name 
itself does not attract protection as a literary work. However, in his judgement, Graham J points out 
that his decision depends on the highly artificial nature of the word " Exxon" ; he concedes that a title 
can be registered for copyright if it has qualities or characterisitics in itself. Thinking up a name 
approriate for a character might well be seen to come within this. Graham J goes on, with reference to 
Lewis Carroll's "Jabberwocky" , to say that the combination of the name with the literary work in 
which it appears and the images which it evokes is enough to justify the grant of copyright protection. 
This approach was then adopted by the Court of Appeal. So, the writer submits that the use of the 
name of a fictional character, even on its own right, appears to be capable of being protected by 
copyright. 
15 
recognised, a real character has no copyright in his or her face. 
25 With real characters, 
copyright only subsists in the form the character takes. Thus, there would be no 
infringement of c9pyright in a photograph to take another similar photograph of a 
celebrity, for example, and emblazon it on a T-shirt even though copyright does 
subsist in the photograph. 
One maJor problem with the application of copyright law in the character 
merchandising area is the fact that although where a character has a distinctive 
appearance copyright will generally provide protection (irrespective of whether the 
unauthorised reproduction of the work is by way of false endorsement) copyright 
infringement may be avoided by alterations which may not be significant enough to 
deprive the image of an association with the original character in the minds of 
consumers. Although copyright infringement arises where a "substantial part" of the 
work is copied, what amounts to a clear association with a character does not align 
precisely with what amounts to copyright infringement. As Katekar has argued, this 
"gap" is attributable to the different motivations behind copyright protection and the 
protection of character merchandising rights. 
(b) Trade Mark Law 
Trade Mark Law was not designed for the protection of character merchandising 
rights. Indeed, it. was designed for quite the opposite reason being to restrict 
monopolies which would cause undesirable detriment to others.
26 However, if the 
character has a mark, name or some distinctive sign, it may qualify for registration as 
a trade mark. It is the distinctive features of a character which will normally be 
capable of trade mark registration. The question arises as to the extent to which the 
25Merchandising Corporation of America v Harpbond Ltd [1983] FSR 32. 
26For example, the same name. Protection distinguishes the proprietor from those of other traders and 
by representing the goodwill of the proprietor it serves as an indication of the quality of the 
proprietor's goods and services. 
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owner of a mark may license it to manufacturers and other businesses to use it in 
relation to their products. 
Thus, the originator of a character may achieve monopoly rights in the name or logo 
(or both) and other images of the character in a particular class of goods by making an 
application for registration in the appropriate class for either his own use or use by a 
registered user. This will not be a problem unless the character has become so well 
known as to have passed into the language.27 
There are several problems with the application of Trade Mark law in the character 
merchandising fiel_d. 
First, not all characters are registrable as marks and the methods by which an 
association with a character may be generated are much broader than the protection 
afforded by the Trade Marks Act. For example, if the reputation of a character 
emerges overnight; the "owner" will simply not have the time to apply for registration 
of any marks, nor obtain any users who may be able to utilise the marks for 
merchandising purposes. Since the owner of a mark must have a bona tide intention 
to use the mark, if the owner cannot find a user, it is not possible to maintain 
registration and the owner is left to seek protection against unauthorised use outside 
the scope of the Act. 28 This gives rise to a problem for the celebrity who does not 
wish to trade for now, but wishes to protect herself or himself and his or her future 
rights from exploitation. Since such a person is not currently trading, trade mark law 
will not protect him or her. 
27For example, in Tarzan Trade Mark [1970] RPC 450, it was held that "Tarzan" had passed into the 
language and could no longer be regarded as an invented word, and that the word was directly 
descriptive of the goods because a film dealing with a the exploits of Tarzan would naturally be 
described as a "Tarzan" film. 
28A H Brown, 'Character Merchandising' (1985) Intellectual Property Law in New Zealand and 
Australia : Legal Research Foundation Seminar, 140. Brown discusses these difficulties for the 
character merchandiser at 140-145. 
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There is also a problem with the traditional, although now more relaxed requirement 
that a trade mark is to identify the commercial or trade origin of the goods or services 
to which it is applied. Words, names, logos and other devices are used to market 
goods and services as trade marks in the traditional sense but they may also be used to 
indicate broader kinds of association with a person, character, institution or event. 
More often it is the appeal of the mark itself rather than the underlying commodity 
which is important in character merchandising.29 
Further, protection of a registered trade mark is denied once the proprietor "traffics" 
in the mark by licensing it for fields of activity over which the proprietor has no 
control.30 This has implications for celebrities who are happy to exploit their fame but 
who usually do not wish to divert their attention to sales and marketing issues to the 
detriment of their musical or sporting talents, for example. The simplest route around 
this problem in most areas of intellectual property law is by the creation of a licensing 
agreement whereby on payment of royalties an entrepeneur can be licensed to carry 
out the actual merchandising operation. However in the trade mark law area this 
solution hits the problem of "trafficking". 
Therefore the intangible values which support the character merchandising industry 
may qualify for protection under the statutory intellectual property regime in New 
Zealand and an overview of the protection afforded by both the Copyright Act 1994 
and the Trade Marks Act does reveal that the nature and scope of these statutes gives 
rise to a natural distinction between 'real' and 'fictional' characters. However while 
the traditional statutory forms of protection will provide considerable assistance in 
the protection of character merchandising rights they are confined to narrow and 
29A Terry, 'Proprietary Rights in Character Merchandising' (1990) Australian Business Law Review 
229,249. 
30Hollie Hobbie Trade Mark [1984) RPC 329. 
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rigidly circumscribed interests and the reach of these laws is insufficient to protect the 
character merchandiser in every case.31 
(c) Development of Passing Off in Response to Character Merchandising 
In the absence of being afforded protection under one of the above intellectual 
property laws, the character merchandiser must look to the common law tort of 
passing off. 
The Fair Trading Act 1986 does include substantial provision for the protection of 
consumers and in New Zealand, a claim in passing off is likely to coincide with an 
action under this Act.32 No explicit distinction between the types of character utilised 
31 In particular circumstances, a character merchandiser may rely on other forms of legal protection, 
such as contract or defamation, particularly where a real character is used to market the goods or 
services. For example, in Tolley v Fry[ 1930) 1 KB 467 , an amateur golfer was able to restrain the use 
of his image in advertisements for Fry's chocolates on the basis that his reputation as an amateur 
would be damaged by the advertisements. The House of Lords held that the advertisement carried an 
innuendo which was capable of being defamatory - namely that the plaintiff as an amateur golfer had 
consented to the use of his name and likeness in an advertisement in exchange for a fee and that this 
would lower him in the estimation of the public. Their Lordships expressly rejected, however, the idea 
of tortious liability for appropriation of personality in the United Kingdom and confirmed that the 
unauthorised use had to be linked with a cause of action in defamation. The writer suggests that the 
reason why the tort of passing off has been so extensively used in this field is because no independent 
action lies for appropriation in English law. Thus, for the purposes of New Zealand law defamation 
presents a possible but highly uncertain cause of action. Breach of Implied Term in Contract and 
Breach of Confidence represent other limited but possible causes of action. In the case of Pollard v 
Photographic Company a commercial photographer, who for a fee, had taken a studio photograph of 
a lady to supply her with prints, was restrained from selling or exhibiting copies got up as a Christmas 
card both on the ground that there was an implied contract not to use the negative for such purposes 
and also on the ground that such sale or exhibition was a breach of faith or breach of confidence. 
32The relationship of the tort of passing off and the Fair Trading Act 1986 was extensively discussed 
by Fisher Jin Tot Toys, Above n 2 ,367-369. Most important is section 9, which proscribes misleading 
and deceptive conduct in trade (or conduct which is likely to have that effect). There is a remedy for 
the plaintiff if it can show that its trade reputation would be damaged by false association with the 
defendant, inferior st,rvices, or dilution of the goodwill in an otherwise distinctive name.
32 The 
existence of goodwill and damage to that goodwill need not be proved. Van Melle has recently argued 
that with its emphasis on misleading or deceptive conduct, section 9 is not as suitable for character 
merchandising cases as misrepresentation is not the issue and the defendant usually has nothing to gain 
from representing a business association given that the defendant's intentions are generally only to 
"harness the beneficial associations intrinsic in the image itself, as distinct from associations with the 
real people and the property which may happen to stand behind the image."
32 
In character merchandising cases the hurdle for the plaintiff is somewhat lower under section 9 in 
making out deceptive copying compared to passing off. However, to gain any remedy the plaintiff 
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by the particular trader is necessary for the purposes of this Act since as long as the 
conduct of that trader is misleading or deceptive liability attaches. As the Act is 
designed to prohibit misleading trade practises and has nothing to do with enshrining 
private property rights this cause of action will not be considered any further for the 
purposes of this paper.11 
The term "passing off' was first coined when the cause of action was limited to 
competitors "passing off' their own goods as if they were the goods of a competitor. 
Today the tort has been expanded to the extent that the question of whether the 
business of a trader has some "connection" with another trader includes the 
possibility that the other trader has endorsed, approved or sponsored the product - not 
merely that the product concerned has been made by that other trader. 
Correspondingly, passing off has broadened to protect goodwill "not in its classic 
form of a trader representing his goods as the goods of somebody else, but in an 
extended form"34 and in doing so it has expanded protection against unfair trading in 
line with legislative developments.35 Murumba has explained the extension of the 
action as being for the protection of "promotional goodwill", (the ability to 
recommend or promote other goods or services or merchandising rights) associated 
with a character in that "the defendant does not necessarily seek to disguise the source 
of his goods or services. He simply makes a representation which links him with the 
plaintiff or his goods. The public, while recognising that the goods or services in 
usually needs to demonstrate that the deception would have a significant impact upon the consumer. 
This is unlike passing off where once the elements of the tort are satisfied the plaintiff cannot be 
denied damages. All remedies under the statute are discretionary and it is a question of whether there 
is sufficiently serious impact upon customers not a question of damage to the plaintiffs goodwill.
32 
Although enacted to protect consumers, the provision is primarily used by traders to prevent deceptive 
conduct of other traders which is detrimental to their interests. 
33S M Crennan QC, 'The Commercial Exploitation of Personality', (1995) Intellectual Property Forum 
25, 46. 
34 Warnink v Townend _& Sons [1979] AC 731, 739 per Lord Diplock. Lord Diplock and Lord Fraser in 
the Advocaat case established the necessary elements for the modem cause of action as being goodwill 
and reputation, a misrepresentation and damage arising from the misrepresentation. 
35The Fair Trading Act.1986. JG Fleming, The Law of Torts (8ed, The Law Book Co, 1992). 
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question come from the defendant, is nevertheless deceived to believing that the 
plaintiff is somehow associated with it."36 
Thus, in character merchandising cases, passing off operates not to ensure consumers 
can correctly identify goods in the marketplace but instead furnishes a proprietary 
right in a product's image to ensure that marketing investments will not be 
misappropriated by competitors. Such cases are actionable if they involve a 
misrepresentation of some connection with the owner of the right in question, such as 
the misrepresentation of sponsorship or endorsement by the plaintiff, or even that the 
unauthorised use has in fact been authorised. 37 The idea is that if a defendant is 
permitted to market its product with impunity, the credibility of the plaintiffs 
character merchandising rights will be imperilled. 
In order to fully appreciate the significance of the conservative New Zealand 
approach to passing off when applied in the character merchandising area it is first 
necessary to review the manner in which the tort has developed in Australia. For the 
purposes of this paper this approach will be referred to as 'the Australian Model'. 
2 'The Australian Model' - The Origins of Fisher J 's Suggestion 
for a Distinction in New Zealand 
Broadly speaking, .a generous version of passing off has been recognised in Australia 
to the extent that it is moving towards a misappropriation doctrine creating an 
absolute proprietary right in reputation. This 'generous version' W...Q.es r§µxplicitly 
require the drawing of a distinction between the use of a real and a fictional character 
such that both real and fictional characters have benefitted from the extra protection 
the extended form· of the tort offers. This is the second of three 'models' considered 
36Murumba, Commercial Exploitation of Personality (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1986), 65 . 
37 A Van Melle, 'Passing Off and Character Merchandising' ( 1996) NZLJ 306. 
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by the writer in examining the validity of Fisher J' s suggestion for a distinction in 
New Zealand. 
The application of the "extended" action of passing off is illustrated by the decision 
of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in enderson v Radio Cor 38. The case 
reveals that ~tralian law recognises that the e should be recognition that' "celebrity" 
may need to be protectable as property capabl! of commercial explojtation. A record - - -
of ballroom dance music was enjoined at the behest of a team of exhibition dancers 
who were portrayed on the cover. The Court held that customers of the record would 
probably believe that the plaintiffs, because of their occupational link to dance music 
recommended the record. The vice of the defendant, identified by the Court, was that 
the ~putation of the lain · heing....use the defend@Uo...se1 · records 
without the plaintiffs' consent. The result ofthis action was held to give the defendant 
the benefit of the plaintiffs' recommendation and to deprive the plaintiffs of the fee or 
remuneration they would have earned if they had been asked for their authority to do 
what was done.39 
The cases since Henderson can conveniently be treated in two streams based on the 
nature of the character involved: in one, those involving the endorsement or licence of 
some~~wn pgson; and in the other, those involving the promotion of a product_ 
by some association with some fictitious character. These two streams, arguably, 
converge in the Crocodile Dundee cases and as a direct result two lines of authority as 
to the precise ambit of this "extended" passing off action have emerged from more 
recent decisions of the Federal Court. 
For the purposes · of a passing off action it is ~er' to establish the necessary 
misre resentation and damage eLem.en1s-where the defendant has made a direct call 
upon the plaintiffs patronage by the appropriation of his or her personal name or 
38(1960) SR (NSW) 576. 
39Above n 38, 603 ... 
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likeness.40 However, where a fictional image is involved it is usually immaterial 
where the image came from. Prior to the Crocodile Dundee Cases discussed below, it 
was not enough merely that the defendant's use was unauthorised; the plaintiff still 
had to establish misrepresentation. For example in Newton-John v Scholl-Plough 
(Aust) Ltd41 the entertainer Olivia Newton -John unsuccessfully claimed passing off 
by the use of her "look-alike" under the description "Olivia? No. Maybelline". 
Burchett J concluded that "the casual reader would get the impression that indeed the 
advertiser had made the use of Olivia Newton-John's reputation to the extent of 
gaining attention, but not to the extent of making any suggestion of association". 
42 
However, the application of passing off to the copying of the name or likeness of a 
fictional character does involve some difficulty because traditionally "appropriation" 
is not actionable per se. A further step is required, namely a misrepresentation of 
some form of authorisation or licence from the plaintiff and arguably it may be 
doubted whether that inference should be open to a court merely on the basis of 
public awareness of the practice of character licensing. This is a criticism which may 
be levelled at the decision of Helsham CJ in Eq. in Children 's Television Workshop 
4°C Pannam, 'Unauthorised Use of Names or Photographs in Advertisements' (1966) 40 ALJ 4. 
4 1(1986) 11 FCR 233 . 
42Further in 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd v Shoshana Pty Ltd (1987) 10 IPR 289 the Australian television 
personality "Sue Smith" unsuccessfully claimed damages for an advertisement that carried the 
announcement "Sue Smith just took total control of her video recorder" and depicted a picture of a 
woman who, like the plaintiff, was brunette but who had otherwise only a general resemblance to the 
plaintiff. It was held by the Full Federal Court that the necessary misrepresentation had not been 
established as the name Sue Smith, being not uncommon, did not point unequivocally to the plaintiff 
and the woman in the advertisement was clearly not the plaintiff. Even the unauthorised use of a 
photograph of the plaintiff was held to not necessarily convey a misrepresentation. In Honey v 
Australian Airlines Ltd (1989) 14 IPR 264 the long jumper and Olympic medallist Gary Honey was 
unable to establish passing off by an airline which had used a photograph of him jumping as the basis 
ofr one of a series of posters promoting Australian sporting activity. The poster had identified the 
plaintiff and carried the airline's logo, but Northrop J was not satisfied that persons seeing the poster 
would see any connection between the plaintiff and the airline or regard the poster as any more than 
"artwork supporting participation and excellence in sport" . The writer submits that this must surely lie 
at the limits of what can be done without authorisation. Where the name or likeness of a person is used 
not in the provision of information about that person but in the promotion of goods and services, there 
may well be a compelling suggestion that the product in question has been favoured in some way by 
that person and that approval has thus been sought. 
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Inc v Woolworths New South Wales Ltd 43. This case concerned the unauthorised 
merchandising of doll representations of the "Muppet" characters. The plaintiffs' 
television series "Sesame Street" and "Muppets" were extremely well known and the 
"Muppet" characters had already been licensed for a wide variety of products sold 
within the jurisdiction. Helsham CJ was satisfied that members of the public were 
aware of the process of character merchandising and would believe that the 
defendant's toys "were being sold under licence from or by means of some sort of 
arrangement with the producer. "44 
These two streams have, arguably, converged with the "Crocodile Dundee" cases 
from which two lines of authority as to the precise ambit of the "extended" passing 
off action have directly emerged. In the first line of authority, the Henderson case was 
picked up by Pincus J in Hogan v Koala Dundee45 . In both the Henderson and Koala 
Dundee cases the plaintiff capitalised upon a real person's reputation (either directly 
or through a fictional character closely associated with the real person) in order to 
promote products. The Courts reasoned that if such actions implied that the 
personality endorsed or authorised the defendant's product, then this was sufficient to 
constitute a 'misrepresentation' for the purposes of passing off. 
In Koala Dundee the defendants promoted their "Dundee Country" shops in 
association with representations of a koala dressed to suggest the leading character in 
the plaintiffs' movie "Crocodile Dundee", "in the hope of having their customers 
make a mental connection with Paul Hogan or the film or both - or to put it more 
simply, of cashing in on Crocodile Dundee".46 It was shown that customers did make 
that "mental connection", but that few considered that the defendants had any 
"commercial arrangement" with the plaintiff. His Honour asserted that " the essence 
of the wrong done ... is not in truth a misrepresentation that there is a licensing or 
43 [1981] RPC 187. 
44Above n 43 , 190. 
45(1988) 20 FCR 314. 
46Above n 45. 
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sponsorship agreement between the applicant and the respondent...it is ... wrongful 
appropriation of a reputation or, more widely, wrongful association of goods with an 
image properly belonging to the applicant."
47 Thus, in observing that the buying 
public had no reason to be concerned as to whether the defendant's had been licensed, 
Pincus J suggested that there was "a degree of artificiality in deciding image-filching 
cases ... on the basis that the vice attacked is misleading the public about licensing 
arrangements."48 He concluded that the essential basis of the protection that the 
common law had allowed to character merchandising "rights" had not been the 
misrepresentation of licensing but the intentional misappropriation of the plaintiffs 
property and he went on to hold for the plaintiffs in passing off. 
On the basis of this line of authority therefore, any "mere association" with the name 
and reputation of the character will be sufficient to infringe the "owner's" right of 
property and because of the fact that no 'misrepresentation' in the traditional sense is 
be required this indicates that deception of the consuming public need not be 
considered either. 
Subsequent decisions of the Federal Court have not expressly approved the approach 
taken in Koala Dundee49 despite the fact that this approach is currently reported as 
being the 'AustraHan' approach to passing off. Gummow J in ConAgra Inc v McCain 
Foods (Aust)50 reiterated the necessity for the elements of reputation, 
misrepresentation and damage to be proven in any passing off action. 
47 Above n 35, 325.Pincus J was not alone in suggesting that the action for passing off had developed 
into an action for misappropriation of goodwill or unfair trading withou the need to show a 
misrepresentation. Hexagon PTY Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1975) 7 ALR 233 and 
Willard King Organisation PTY Ltd v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd [ 1981 ]2 NSWLR 54 7. Ricketson, 
'Reaping Without Sowing : Unfair Competition and Intellectual Property Rights in Anglo- Australian 
Law' (1984) 7 UNSWLJ 1. 
48Above n 2, 45. 
49In Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltdv Philip Morris Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 414 the High Court, (albeit in a 
different context) rejected any general action for unfair competition in Australia 
50(1992) 33 FCR 302. 
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In Hogan v Pacific Dunfop51 the same judge heard the matter at first instance and 
rejected the notion of misappropriation. His Honour held that misappropriation of 
reputation without the necessary kind of misrepresentation will not suffice for passing 
off. The defendant's television advertising for its "Grosby" shoes was in the form of a 
parody of the well known "knife scene" in the movie, featuring shoes instead of a 
knife and with the actors resembling those in the film, though the central character 
was dressed in the matter of "Crocodile Dundee". His Honour found that the image 
of the character Mick Dundee in the film "Crocodile Dundee" was used without 
authorisation by the respondents as a "hook" to "grab" the attention of viewers. 
However, his Honour found that to maintain a passing off action he had to be satisfied 
that there was a reasonable likelihood that a substantial number of persons would 
have formed the impression that Paul Hogan and the makers of the film had some 
commercial association with the producers of the advertisement ("the reasonable 
likelihood of confusion" test). In finding this to be the case Gurnmow J effectively 
extended passing off to cover a misrepresentation that a fictitious character had 
endorsed or approved a product in circumstances where the fictitious character is so 
closely linked with the actor playing the part that the public is likely to be misled into 
thinking that the actor had endorsed or approved the product. Thus, on the basis of 
Gurnmow J's approach, arguably, where such a link does not exist passing off cannot 
be relied upon since as fictional characters do not 'exist', the public is unlikely to be 
misled into thinking that they endorse or approve any product.
52 
His reasoning was approved when the case went on appeal to the Full Federal Court 
such that the defendant was held to have misrepresented that the shoes had Paul 
Hogan's endorsement. The same approach was subsequently taken by Tamberlin Jin 
the Duff Beer Case. 53 
51 (1988) 12 IPR 225 .. 
52S G Corones, 'Basking in Reflected Glory: Recent Character Merchandising Cases'(l990) Australian 
Business Law Review 5, 13. 
53 An unusual aspect of this case is that it concerns not a fictional "character" as such, but a "make-
believe" product, namely the fictional Duff Beer which is coupled with a character, a background 
institution (Duff Brewery) and also with the associated advertising signs, posters and images of the 
26 
The essence of the Australian doctrine with its evolving emphasis on 
'misappropriation' is the extension of the tort to provide effective protection in both 
personality and fictional character merchandising cases without the need to draw a 
distinction between the two. This will remain the position so long as all that is 
required is the 'wrongful appropriation of a reputation, or more widely, wrongful 
association of goods properly belonging to the applicant' .
54 The implications and 
acceptability of this model are discussed in Part IV. 
(a) The 'New Zealand approach ' to passing off and character merchandising-
the 'Australian Model ' critiqued 
The New Zealand approach to the application of passing off in the character 
merchandising area is currently uncertain because there have been few cases brought 
before the Courts and those which have have been at the interlocutory level such that 
the issues have never been fully explored./ here have been no cases brou ht b a 
' real' character o~ the owner of a fictional character played b al erson An 
examination of the cases which have been brought does reveal, however, t at a 
conservative approach to the requirements of passing off is likely to be taken in the 
future in contrast to other Australasian judgments which, to some extent acknowledge 
the confines but in effect extend the tort into a form of action that could more 
accurately be labelled as "unfair trading". 55 
beer which play an important role in "The Simpson" series. These features formed part of the fictional 
" environment" in which the stories are played out. It plays a background role as part of the fictional 
world which the characters inhabit. Further, Lion sought to avoid liability by including a disclaimer on 
the beer can that their product was in no way authorised by The Simpsons. It is interesting that in his 
first judgment in the Duff Beer Case, Tarnberlin J ignored the distinction between cases concerning 
endorsement by real personalities and true character merchandising cases in order to extend the 
principle to purely fictional characters. In his second judgment he then attempted to draw upon these 
distinctions to justify the inefficacy of a disclaimer. 
54Koa/a Dundee per Pincus J, Above n 45 . 
55P Sumpter, 'New Zealand Intellectual Property Law Observations and Recent Developments' 
(1993) 4 AIPJ 93, 101-102. 
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In Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell the plaintiff failed in a substantive hearing to establish that 
it had sufficient goodwill in the overall shape, colour and appearance of a children's 
pull along wooden toy bee. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had copied the 
get-up, particularly capricious (non-functional) features of the product, to such an 
extent that customers would be likely to assume that the defendant's product was that 
of the plaintiff. In this respect, the case was really of "classical" passing off. Fisher J 
held that no such confusion was likely and accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs 
action. In the case, the alleged infringement of the plaintiffs character merchandising -rights was a subsidiary argument and was not argued in detail before Fisher J. 
Arguably this is not surprising. The argument appears to have been that the plaintiff's 
product had developed such a following as to have generated a "character", and the 
plaintiff had applied its likeness to other products. The launch of the defendant's 
product had prejudiced the plaintiff's opportunity to licence others to use the Buzzy 
Bee image for promotional purposes. 
In dealing with the argument concerning 'character merchandising rights', the Judge 
was somewhat critical of recent Australian cases where "a generous version of 
passing off appears to have been recognised". 5
6 In his view while it is desirable to 
have consistency in commercial matters between two CER countries, New Zealand 
should hesitate before following the character merchandising approach favoured in 
Australia. 
In doing so he immediately identified the problems with satisfying the ingredients of 
passing off, particularly misrepresentation and damage and particularly in cases of 
"artificial" character merchandising. Thus, he acknowledged, albeit impliedly, that a 
natural distinction falls between the types of character in question in any given case 
and that the nature of the character will largely determine the likelihood of success in 
satisfying the required elements. 
56Above n 2,361. 
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As outlined above, to satisfy the 'extended' action in passing off, a plaintiff must be 
able to prove that the defendant has misrepresented the plaintiff's involvement in that 
there is a supposeq. sponsorship or licensing agreement between the parties which has 
some connection with the plaintiffs reputation (for example, as a guarantee of 
quality). Once it is shown that there has been a misappropriation of the plaintiffs 
promotional goodwill, the court will look for the necessary misrepresentation. 
While there may be genuine deception in some cases, particularly where a real image 
is used, in many other instances, especially where use is made of an artificial 
character of the cartoon or caricature type , the real object and effect of the use of the 
artificial images in character merchandising "will be non deceptive [for in] that 
situation, reliance upon passing off to protect character merchandising rights becomes 
possible only if the Court is willing to entertain a legal fiction."
57 
As Fisher J commented, in cases of "artificial" (fictional) character merchandising 
the presence of any misrepresentation leading to deception would be fortuitous 
"because the point may be to project an association with a beneficial image per se ; 
not a commercial connection with the persons responsible for creating or licensing 
it.. .There is nothing inherently deceptive in showing one's product and juxtaposing it 
with a popular man-made image, any more than there would be in juxtaposing it with 
an image drawn from nature." In his view, the root of the problem lies in the object of 
most "artificial" cl:iaracter merchandising for "where a fictional or man made image is 
involved, it is usually immaterial where the image came from and who created it. All 
that matters is that it is already established in the public eye and that it has favourable 
connotations. At least with images of that kind, there is no incentive to deceive the 
public about anything. The defendant is not making any 'representation' beyond 
57 Above n 2, 361 
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reminding the public that such an image exists and saymg (truthfully) that the 
defendant's product is appearing with it in the same advertisement."
58 
It is interesting per se that the judge drew a contrast with character merchandising of 
real persons and suggested that there may well be a case for developing the law in 
line with American causes of action such as appropriation of personality and the right 
to publicity. But the dictim of Pincus J in Koala Dundee, that the inventor of a 
sufficiently famous fictional character having certain visual or other traits could 
thereby prevent others using the character to sell their goods (independently of 
copyright or trade mark law) was considered to be "rather wide".
59 In this regard the 
judge drew support from the "reservations" of two Australian commentators, Terry 
and Howell. 60 
More specifically related to the issue of whether or not the law should recognise a 
distinction between the types of character in question in any given case, and where 
Fisher J' s discussion of character merchandising may be of value, is as a reminder of 
the need to examine carefully the evidence of actual or likely deception and not be 
distracted by the assumption that something of value has been misappropriated. This 
58Above n 2, 361. 
59 Above n, 2. On the aspect of damage it was said that in Koala Dundee and in other similar decisions 
the damage relied upon was the possible loss of opportunity to license the merchandising right. But 
that, the judge decideq, was necessarily a circular argument: the right to exact a fee came about only if 
a plaintiff had an enforceable right, she could sue in passing off only if she could show a loss and this 
loss was the loss of a right to a fee. As Sumpter has commented, "whether this judicial attempt to pull 
back the expansionary moves in "artificial" character merchandising protection demonstrated in recent 
Australian cases will succeed is another question." It is arguable that the form of damage comprising 
loss of opportunity to license image (be it artificial or personal) is merely a recognition of another 
modem version of commercial injury. Futher the concept of damage in passing off cases is relatively 
flexible. In the only other reported New Zealand decision dealing at least partly with character 
merchandising arguments, Gloss v TVNZ (1989) 3 TCLR 83,88 the Court, in an interim injunction 
application, accepted a submission that there might be a "dilution of the goodwill by the inference that 
the defendant is either associated with or approved or licensed" by the plaintifff. McGechan J in New 
Zealand Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association Inc v Television New Zealand Limited and 
Saatchi and Saatchi (1996) 35 IPR 55, 11 noted that loss of sponsorship opportunities "difficult to 
measure in advance" was relevant in weighing the balance of convenience in an interim injunction 
application. 
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is arguably the central aggravating feature of the Australian approach which is, 
essentially an invocation of the American doctrine of misappropriation, the rationale 
underpinning the tort being the Bible epithet of preventing those who would 
otherwise reap where they have not sown. 
It is submitted that Fisher J's approach is the most justified approach such that in the 
character merchandising context, on the basis of the principles of "reaping without 
sowing" and "unfair competition", there can be no justification for the endowment of 
proprietary rights, (which would essentially be 'anticipatory') in artificial characters 
or in real characters where no protection exists under existing intellectual property 
statutes, including copyright and trademark legislation, or where the traditional 
elements of passing off are not made out. To do so would egregiously hamper the 
competitive process. Outside copyright and trade mark protection the form of the 
"Bee" should not be protected because there are no policy reasons justifying the 
endowment of prqprietary rights in these circumstances. The doors of competition 
must be kept open and the market available. The implications of Fisher J's remarks 
are considered in more detail below. 
3 'The American Model' 
In determining the validity of a distinction between the types of character in any 
character merchandising case some assistance may be drawn from the approach taken 
in the United States of America. In America, different approaches to the protection of 
images of characters are taken depending upon whether the character is a person or 
not. The writer submits that the American approach to the protection of character 
merchandising rights should be the model followed in New Zealand. 
60 Above n 2 , Terry _& Howell, "The Unauthorised Use of Celebrity Photographs in Advertising" 
(1991) 65 ALJ 587, 590 and "Character Merchandising : The Marketing Potential Attaching to a 
Name, Image Persona or Copyright Work" (1991) 6 [Can] IPJ 197,207. 
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Where the character is not a person, the question of whether the rights of the "owner" 
of that character are infringed by a publication of that character's image is whether 
there is a relevant "likelihood of confusion" in the minds of the public as to whether 
there is a licensing, approval or sponsorship arrangement between the "owner" of the 
character and the product concerned. 
American Courts appear to accept that a creator of a character has the exclusive right 
to commercial exploitation of the reputation associated with that character because 
the public would expect that to be the case.
61 Whilst the wrong identified is that the 
reputation of the character is wrongfully appropriated, the test of whether that 
appropriation is wrongful is whether the defendant is "imposing upon the plaintiff a 
risk that the defendant's goods would be associated by the public with the plaintiff. "
62 
The question appears to be whether there is a probable confusion as to sponsorship, 
affiliation or connection with a character concerned
63 
It has been suggested that, in American law, a simple "misappropriation of 
merchandising property" is sufficient, without the element of confusion.
64 McCarthy, 
however asserts that this misappropriation theory has been rejected.
65 For example, 
Sears, Roebuck and Co were not prevented from using its name "BAGZILLA" and a 
comic creature in relation to its "monstrously strong garbage bags". The mere pun on 
the name "GODZILLA" was not likely to cause confusion in the minds of the public 
as to any sponsorship arrangements."66 
61 This was partly the result of a survey conducted in 1983 when 250 persons were interviewed and 
asked whether they agreed with the statement that "no product can bear the name of an entertainer, 
cartoon character or some other famous person unless permission is given for its use of the owner, 
name or character": 91 per cent agreed with the statement. Harrison, 'The Merchandising Reporter's 
first consumer survey on licensing' (1993) 2 Merchandising Rep 22. 
62 Triangle Publications.Inc v Rohlich 167F 2d 969 77 USPQ 196, 77 EUSPQ 294 (2d) Cir (1948). 
63 Universal City Studios Inc v Nintendo Co 746 F 2d 112,223, USPQ 1000 (2d Cir 1984). 
64 Grimes and Battersby, "The Protection of Merchandising Properties" (1979) 69 Trade Mark Rep 
431, 1. 
65 McCarthy, above n 16. 
66 Toho Co v Sears Roebuck & Co 645 F 2d 788, 210 USPQ 547 (9th Cir 1981 ). 
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Where the character is a natural person the question of whether the rights of that 
person are infringed by a publication of a certain image depends on whether that 
person is identifiable from that image. This approach stems from a person's inherent 
right as a person to the exclusive use of his or her persona for commercial purposes. 
This 'right of publicity' has arisen out of the general tort of invasion of privacy and 
protects the commercial value of personality to the extent that it recognises an 
intangible property right to prevent misappropriation of the plaintiff's name or 
likeness to the defendant's advantage. The right to publicity varies from State to 
State, some States not recognising it at all, others recognising it as only the right of a 
living person, and some regarding it as property that may be passed to one's heirs. 
Some States, such as New York and California, being the centres of show business, 
have given statutory recognition to the right however, statutory recognition varies 
between States. Although there has been separate development of the right to 
publicity and the right to privacy, the privacy roots of the former remain and where a 
right to publicity is recognised as a right independent of privacy, the plaintiff must 
show that he or she is a public figure with a valuable personality.
67 The right has now 
been "codified" in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, having largely 
been separated from its privacy antecedents.68 
The precise definition of the right to publicity is not settled at law. However, the right 
to publicity may be loosely defined as the right of a celebrity over all aspects of his or 
her image, and over which he or she has control as his or her property.
69 It is limited 
by public interest concerns such as freedom of information and freedom of speech.
70 
67 Frazer, 'Appropriation of Personality- A New Tort?' (1983) 9 LQR 309. 
68 Sheldon W Halpern.<halpern.l@osu.edu> 
69 Caenegem, 'Different Approaches to the Protection of Celebrities Against the Unauthorised Use of 
their Image in Advertising" [1990) 12 EIPR 455 . 
70 In contrast to New Zealand, Australia, Canada and England, the United States provides an 
overriding constitutional guarantee of freedom of information in the public interest. This provides 
freedom to the Press to gather "news". First Amendment to the US Constitution. For example, in New 
Kids on the Block v Gannett Satellite Information and News America Publishing US District Court 
Central District of California, 6 September 1990, Rea J, Unreported, the Court found that the use of 
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There must be a balancing between the values protected by the First Amendment to 
the Constitution and misappropriation of a plaintiffs intangible property rights. 
The Courts have placed other limits on the protection of certain aspects of 
personality, and in particular, upon vocal likeness as a common law right of publicity. 
In Midler v Ford 71 the defendants' advertisement promoting a Ford motor car made 
use of a sound-a-like who purposely imitated the voice of Bette Midler to a song she 
had popularised, "Do You Want to Dance". Neither the voice nor the picture of 
Midler were used, and no express reference was made to her. The defendants' had 
obtained copyright permission to use the lyrics and music but had imitated Midler 
without her consent. The evidence showed that viewers thought it was Midler singing. 
The United States Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit found that Midler enjoyed 
common law property rights in her distinctive voice and that there had been a 
misappropriation of her likeness.72 The Court outlined limits which are to be placed 
on the protection of this particular aspect of personality. For example, not every voice 
imitation would be protected unless the voice was distinctive. The more substantial 
the reputation involved, the more likely the Courts will grant protection. In this case 
Midler was a professional singer and had won Grarnrny Awards. Other limits 
including, the need for there to have been a deliberate imitation for marketing 
purposes and for unfair competition and damage to have resulted have also been 
placed. 
The importance of the need for limits to be placed on the protection of personality is 
no more starkly highlighted than by the dissenting judge in the case of White v 
the New Kids' name and likeness in connection with surveys on the pop group by callers dialling 
numbers beginning with "900" was related to news gathering and not mere commercial exploitation. 
The commercial venture was such as not to outweigh the right to exercise freedom of speech. 
71 (1988) US App. Lexis 8424. 
72 Above n 70. Her voice was an attribute of her identity and was of value to the defendants, this being 
the reason why they used an imitation (the value was the market value that would have been paid had 
she sung in person). 
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Samsung Electronics Arnerica73. In the event that a similar right to publicity is 
recognised in New Zealand the writer submits that Circuit Judge Kozinski's judgment 
should be fully examined and his reasoning adopted. 
The defendant ran an advertising campaign promoting its consumer electronics. One 
series of advertisements depicted a robot dressed in a wig, gown and jewels 
reminiscent of Vanna White's hair and dress and the robot posed next to a Wheel of 
Fortune game board. The caption read, "Longest running game show 2012 AD". 
Samsung did not use White's name, voice or likeness. The advertisement was meant 
to convey that Samsung products would be around when White had been replaced by 
a robot. White sued alleging that the defendant had infringed her right of publicity by 
"appropriating" her "identity". 
The California Civil Code 3344(a) provides that a person has a right to use their 
name, likeness, signature and voice for commercial purposes. The majority held that 
this right extends beyond name and likeness to any appropriation of one's identity -
anything evoking one's personality. Dissenting Judge Kozinski recognised that the 
majority approach "is creating a new and much broader property right ... it's replacing 
the existing balance between the interests of the celebrity and those of the public by a 
different balance ... more favourable to the celebrity . .. every famous person now has 
an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of her." 
As the judge outlines, the endowment of such a property right with no limitations, 
violates the Copyright regime by refusing to recognise a parody exception to the 
right, by refusing to recognise a fair use exception and by doing away with any need 
for an idea expression dichotomy. For example, it would be extremely difficult to 
parody a movie or television show without at the same time evoking the identities of 
the actors. The overall effect of the majority approach is to impoverish the public 
domain to the detriment of future creators and the public at large. 
73 !993) 989 Fed Rep (2 ed) 1512 9th Circuit 
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The writer submits that if a distinction between the types of characters is drawn for 
the purposes of New Zealand law, and in the event that an action along the lines of 
the American right to publicity is recognised, there should not be unlimited 
protection for real characters where other intellectual property laws will be 
undermined and where the balancing of competing policy considerations weighs in 
favour of denying protection. The same must be said for the opposite end of the 
spectrum, that is, in relation to protection for fictional characters. It would be 
essential that limits be placed on the extent of protection granted given that policy 
reasons for protection must be established before the image of a character merits 
protection. Where protecting such an image would have the effect of undermining the 
effect of existing laws and in the absence of any other social or economic 
justification, protection should rightfully be denied. It is simply untenable to endow 
the 'owners' of characters with the exclusive right to the use of all images, references 
or recollections of a character for a commercial purpose. 
IV AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR THE VALIDITY 
OF A DISTINCTION IN NEW ZEALAND 
An analysis of the three 'models' reveals that in the United States, and in New 
Zealand, there is judicial recognition of the need for a distinction between the type of 
character involved in any given character merchandising case. This is in marked 
contrast to the more recently developed approach in Australia which is to employ a 
"misappropriation test" such that there need be no distinction drawn. All that a 
plaintiff is required to establish is a wrongful appropriation of a reputation, or, more 
widely, a wrongful association of goods properly belonging to the plaintiff. No 
misrepresentation in the sense that there is a representation of the plaintiffs 
endorsement, approval or sponsorship of the defendant's good or service is required 
for the purposes of Australian law. This then avoids the problem faced by character 
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merchandisers who utilises purely 'fictional' characters given that where a fictional 
image is involved it is difficult to establish the traditional 'misrepresentation' 
requirement because of the fact that it is usually immaterial where the image came 
from. 
The implications of the general action which has emerged in Australia are numerous. 
Any general action for the protection against the 'misappropriation' of character 
merchandising "images" sets up huge monopoly rights and tends to defeat the policies 
inherent in copyright and trade mark legislation. The policies in the legislation are as 
significant for their provisions as to what is not protected, not only through express 
exclusions but also through the implied exclusions through the definition of what is 
protected. If a more general test is used as it is in Australia, there is a risk that 
competitors will use lawsuits or threats of suits under it to discourage and eliminate 
competition. This would then have the effect of increasing the expense because of the 
evidence which needs to be adduced in such a case. If, for example, a trade mark 
cannot be registered, protection lies in the uncertain realm of passing off and, as Lord 
Bridge in the Holly Hobbie case74 commented, "this is likely to generate a mass of 
difficult and expensive litigation which cannot be in the public interest."
75 
The 'misappropriation' test currently applied in Australia, a test which does not 
require the drawing of a distinction between the types of character involved, has other 
significant implications. For example, where the image of a person has been used for 
comparison purposes only, while there may have been a clear misappropriation there 
should be no infringement of the rights of the proprietor of that character. One of the 
assumptions of the competitive economic model is that consumers are aware of the 
quality of goods on the market. The extent of the quality of a particular product may 
be communicated to consumers by comparing it to a competing product. As long as it 
is not done in a misleading way, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with 
74 Above n 30. 
75 Above n 30,487. 
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comparative advertising. Rather, it improves the knowledge of consumers. In the 
Newton-John v Scholl-Plough (Australia) Ltd case 
16, for example, the purpose of the 
advertisement was by way of comparison. There was no suggestion that the person 
depicted in the photograph was Olivia Newton-John herself and while the casual 
reader would get the impression that the advertiser had made use of her reputation to 
the extent of gaining attention, they would not get the impression that the advertiser 
was making any suggestion of association. The Court rightfully held that her interest 
in the protection of her reputation was not infringed. 
What can be said for the general Australian approach is that it avoids many of the 
difficult issues which must be resolved by those jurisdictions wishing to recognise a 
distinction. It is all very easy to advocate for the need to draw a distinction in any 
given case, however, there is the issue as to where the 'line' should be drawn. Given 
that the writer has recognised that there are four possible 'types' of character 
(ranging from the natural person to the fictional character played by the natural 
person to the fictional character of the cartoon, toy or screen character type) the law 
must be able to create a degree of certainty for potential litigants as to the appropriate 
causes of action for the 'owner' of the type of character in the given case. Should the 
distinction be at the one level ; between 'real' and 'fictional' characters or should it be 
between real characters in their 'natural' capacity and the three other types of 
characters lumped together. How should the law accommodate the fictional character 
played by the real person, the effect of which is to, essentially, blur any distinction 
which may be drawn. What should the remedies be, given that a 'misappropriation' 
doctrine would not suffice because of its failure to acknowledge the need for such a 
distinction? 
There is then the issue as to whom the relevant 'owner' of the images and rights 
associated with a particular character is and who is entitled any available remedies. 
77 
76 Above n 41. 
77 This issue falls outside the bounds of this paper and will not be analysed further. 
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For example, who 'owns' the names, and images associated with a sports team? 
What is the situation when someone misappropriates the image of a team by 
suggesting there . is some sponsorship arrangement between a plaintiff and a 
defendant. If someone wishes to utilise the images of members of the team who is to 
consent - the entire team or the player or players concerned? Similarly, in the White v 
Samsung case discussed above, "why is Vanna's right to exclusive profit and use of 
her persona, a persona that might not even be her own creation but that of a writer, 
director or producer, superior to Samsung's right to profit by creating its own 
inventions."78 The writer submits that these issues can only really be fleshed out when 
the Courts are confronted with more cases on the issue of protection and given the 
growing nature of the practice, this should not be far off. 
If New Zealand law is to recognise that, prima facie, a distinction should be drawn, 
and therefore, that such a distinction is both valid and necessary, it must then provide 
acceptable remedies, within socially and economically justified bounds, for the 
'owners' of characters from each of the four different types of character identified. 
That is to say tha~ after balancing the competing policy factors detailed above, the 
natural person whose image has been wrongfully appropriated may be justified in 
seeking a remedy just as the 'owner' of an image in an artificial character may. That 
is not to say, however, that the extent of protection should remain the same, or even 
the type of protection. The writer submits that in accepting that a distinction is valid if 
the implications of the general Australian approach are to be avoided, the time has 
come for New Zealand law to rationalise as to whether a right to publicity, along the 
American lines, should be recognised and, at the opposite end of the 'character 
spectrum', whether in the absence of protection under the current statutory 
intellectual property regime and under the extended passing off action, the 'owners' 
of artificial characters deserve protection from unauthorised use. 
78 Above n 73. 
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In accepting that there should be a distinction drawn between the types of characters 
in any given case, a number of secondary issues must be dealt with before some 
assessment of the way the law should protect character merchandising rights in New 
Zealand can be made. The writer deals with the issues pertaining to 'real' characters 
and those pertaining to 'fictional' characters in the discussion which follows. 
A Issues for the 'Real' Character Merchandiser 
Given that the writer has identified that different policy considerations anse m 
relation to 'real' characters based on a natural person's inherent right to privacy, it is 
not surprising that there are additional factors to consider when determining where 
exactly the 'line' should be drawn and how, if one is drawn, the 'owner' of the natural 
person's image is to derive protection from unauthorised use. 
To begin with, there are some problems with attaching a property element to 
personality particularly in drawing a distinction between that right and the right of 
others, an issue which arises particularly where the type of character in question is a 
natural person who is playing the part of a fictional character. 
The Mid/er case emphasised the notion of the value of Midler' s vocal characteristics 
to others. The defendants had copyright in the lyrics. A conflict arises therefore, 
because although the copyright owner had rights in the song itself, the singer's 
property rights in her vocal attributes were infringed because it sounded like the 
singer herself. The District Court was concerned that such protection may be at the 
expense of the copyright holder for the copyright holder may have to purchase 
additional rights to perform a song to avoid facing litigation. Therefore, in the context 
of sound-a-like claims, the Courts must be careful to distinguish between precise and 
generic similarities. 
40 
The writer submits that this is also of relevance to look-a-likes, such as allegations 
that Madonna has in the past attempted to snatch the image of Marilyn Monroe. 
Madonna may have taken advantage of Marilyn's popularity, but Madonna does have 
some genetic similarities. Had the vocalist's natural voice sounded like Midler, the 
result in that case may have been different. The alternative view is that deliberate use 
of such a voice to draw the association with Midler is actionable wrongful 
appropriation. 
If a distinction is recognised for the purposes of New Zealand law, a proprietary 
interest in personality has other significant ramifications. For example, does this 
mean that it has an inheritable quality along with the other property comprised in an 
estate. The issue of whether the right of publicity ceases with the death of a celebrity 
or whether it survives death and can be passed onto heirs by will or licence has been 
considered by various States in America due to the recognition of the right to 
publicity as property, rather than as a personal right. Questions then arise as to 
descendability and assignability, the ability generally to realise the property value in 
the marketplace (alienability), and as outlined, issues as to competing rights to an 
image, questions which must be asked of other intangible property rights. 
In determining whether it is desirable to recognise that there should be a valid 
distinction drawn between types of characters, and therefore, to recognise a right of 
publicity along American lines to protect the 'real' character, there are other 
considerations which need to be factored into the balancing equation. The first is the 
economic efficiency of recognising private property rights in respect of personalities. 
Secondly, there are ethical considerations including the effect on the distribution of 
wealth and the limitation of free speech and information. Thirdly, there is a 
jurisprudential question as to the compatibility of such a right with the scheme of 
English - based property law which does not recognise a right to privacy as such. A 
detailed discussion of these issues falls outside the bounds of this paper. 
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B Issues for the 'Fictional' Character Merchandiser 
The crux of the issue for the character merchandiser who utilises 'fictional ' 
characters, be they fictional characters played by real people or fictional characters 
which are not, is whether or not the creator is protected where there has been 
' unauthorised' use of the image and reputation of the character which does not deem 
there to have been a breach of the statutory intellectual property regime or where 
passing off fails to provide a remedy. 
As outlined in the preceding analysis, the protection afforded by copyright and trade 
laws is confined to narrow and rigidly prescribed circumstances and should a 
conservative approach to the elements of the tort of passing off be required in New 
Zealand (as Fisher J's judgment in Tot Toys suggests will be) there will be numerous 
instances where the creator of a fictional character will be denied a remedy. An 
example would be where there has been a misappropriation of the image and 
reputation of a screen character but not one which would lead one to assume that 
there was a representation that the 'misappropriator' was the licensee or was the 
subject of some sponsorship agreement with the 'creator' .Where this is the case the 
only chance of the owner being granted a remedy is if the ' character' is deemed to fall 
within the bounds of the statutory intellectual property regime. 
The issue therefore becomes, whether some protection should be afforded in this 
instance and the only means of affording protection in these circumstances would be 
for New Zealand law to recognise a 'misappropriation test' along the lines of the 
Australian model. Fisher J has clearly rejected this option given that he has 
recognised that it is not easy to see how "the association of goods properly belonging 
to the applicant" could be wrongful on any basis other than either a property right or 
the misrepresentaion that the defendant had some form of association with those who 
stood behind the image. As he commented, "it cannot be false for the defendant to 
assert that his goods have some form of association with the image itself, divorced 
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from its proprietors and their other property, if the association amounts to nothing 
more than joint appearance of the image and the defendant's product in the same 
advertisement. If it is a property right instead of a deception, where did it come from? 
It cannot be suggested that it came from passing off, since passing off requires 
deception. "79 
Further, it is simply unjustifiable to endow the owners of characters with the 
exclusive right to the use of all images, references or recollections of a character for a 
commercial purpose. New Zealand law does not protect all intangible elements of 
value which may flow from the exercise by an individual of his or her powers or 
resources, whether in business or by the use of ingenuity, knowledge, skill or labour, 
Some other social or economic justification is required. A test of misappropriation, 
based on it is on the notion of 'reaping without sowing', is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the precepts of New Zealand law and with acceptable principle. 
To endow proprietary rights in an image of an artificial character where no such rights 
are available from the statutory intellectual property regime would be inconsistent 
with the general policy principles discussed in Part II. Rather than unjustifiably 
extending the tort of passing off to enable such protection, the writer submits that 
there may be arguments in favour of reforming the statutory intellectual property 
regime to ensure that it caters for the growing practice of character merchandising. 
In accepting that a distinction should be drawn between the types of characters in 
question in any given case, there are arguments for and against providing more 
protection to the character merchandiser who utilises fictional characters to market his 
or her goods and services, just as there are for those who employ real people to do so. 
As Fisher J outlines in his judgment, there is already considerable protection for the 
former from trade marks, registered designs, patents, the Fair Trading Act, copyright, 
and where there really is the false representation of an association with the plaintiff or 
79 Above n 2, 362-363. 
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his or her goods and independent damage such that conventional passing off provides 
a remedy. 80 
There are several· policy considerations which favour increasing protection for the 
'fictional' character merchandiser. For example, the incentive principle suggests that 
the opportunity to profit from a 'monopoly' encourages individuals to devote their 
time and resources to the creation and promotion of images which in turn have the 
potential to bring pleasure and value to mankind as a whole. Further an argument 
could be made that there is a consumer's interest to be served in facilitating the 
identification of commercial sources and associations. This, however, is a strained 
argument because character merchandising is a poor guide to origin or quality. Most 
of the time the choice of the licensed user in an unrelated field will have turned upon 
nothing more than his or her being the highest bidder. 81 
There are, however, stronger arguments in favour of not creating 'fresh monopolies' 
in this area. The notion that people should have the freedom to express themselves, to 
comment and criticise, the fact that the community should have access to intellectual 
developments anq the public interest in competition favour not protecting the 
'fictional' character merchandiser in every situation. In applying the test for passing 
off, consideration must be given to the extent to which the recognition of those rights 
would impinge upon the public's right to free speech and expression as the door 
needs to be left open for satire and parody. Some characters, for example, become so 
famous that they become part of society and folklore. To inhibit any mention of these 
characters may impose restrictions on the public. Therefore, some room for parody, 
satire, education and fair comment is necessary. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against adopting a similar test to that used in the 
Australian jurisdiction, the effect of which is to not draw a distinction between the 
80 Above n2, 364. 
81 Above n 2, 364. 
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types of characters in question and therefore to provide a remedy, with essen
tially no 
limits and in the absence of strong social and policy considerations justifying
 this, is 
the argument that aspects of the current statutory intellectual property laws
 will be 
undermined. 
Undoubtedly, in extending the protection of artificial character merchandising
 rights, 
relationship to existing legislation must be considered. There can be no just
ification 
for the endowment of proprietary or other rights in artificial characters w
here no 
protection exists under existing intellectual property statutes, particularly tra
de mark 
and copyright legislation, or where the traditional elements of passing off
 are not 
made out. The endowment of 'proprietary' rights, in these circumstances, and
 with no 
limitations, has the effect of violating these statutory regimes. For e
xample, 
protection of industrially applied copyright works is deliberately limited to 
16 years 
and other coprighted works, registered designs and patents are similarly lim
ited to 
finite periods. The extension of the tort of passing off to the extent that has o
ccurred 
in Australia would mean that the ability for a plaintiff to enforce the fact th
at there 
has been a misappropriation of his or her character's image and reputation
 would 
continue infinitely. This would have the effect of hampering competiti
on and, 
moreover, not all harmful competition is unfair or unlawful. Most importan
t is the 
countervailing public interest in free competition which often demands prior
ity even 
at the cost of condoning practices which deserve censure as dishonest trading. 
Other aspects of the intellectual property statutes outlined in the preceding 
analysis 
which would appear unnecessary should passing off be extended
 to a 
'misappropriation' doctrine are the requirements of various forms of novelty 
and, or, 
originality. Furthe~, protection of a registered trade mark is denied once the pr
oprietor 
traffics in the mark by licensing it for fields of activity over which the propri
etor has 
no control. Protection under a 'misappropriation' doctrine, which does not req
uire the 
drawing of a distinction between characters, would be granted regardless of th
is. 
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The writer submits that, in general, where copyright, design, or trade mark rights are 
not infringed, a misappropriation is acceptable so long as there is no 
misrepresentation or deception to the public such that the traditional elements of the 
'extended' action in passing off are satisfied. Obviously a distinction must be drawn 
at some level, between real and fictional characters given that at the extreme ends of 
'character spectrum' there are serious policy issues which suggest that protection 
should or should not be afforded, these issues having unique implications depending 
upon the 'existence' or 'non existence' of the particular character. 
IV CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to explore Fisher J' s suggestion that m determining 
whether or not there should be protection granted in any given character 
merchandising case, judges should begin their analysis of the law by immediately 
drawing a distinction between the promotional use of names, reputations and images 
of real person and artificial character merchandising. 
This area of the law is far from easy. Courts are required to strike a balance between 
three sets of interests. First, a plaintiff has an interest in protecting his or her 
promotional goodwill from misappropriation. Secondly, a defendant has an interest in 
being free to compete without undue restrictions and thirdly, consumers have an 
interest in that they need to be protected against misleading or deceptive conduct by 
traders. The question becomes 'whose interest is to be preferred'? 
Recent character merchandising cases, particularly in Australia, demonstrate that 
Courts have tended to favour protection of the plaintiffs property rights such that 
they have shifted the foundations of the tort of passing off from misrepresentation to 
'misappropriation' and come close to a tort of unfair competition based on the 
principle of 'reaping without sowing'. In doing so they have effectively ignored any 
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need to begin any analysis of the law by recognising that a distinction must be drawn
 
between the type of character in question so that there is now potential for an
 
insufficient boundary to lie between pro-competitive behaviour and anti-competitive
 
behaviour and the 'interests of the owner in protecting the character's reputation. The
 
ultimate effect of this is to undermine aspects of the current statutory and common
 
law intellectual property regimes with the owners of, particularly fictional, character
s 
now being granted protection when they otherwise would not be. 
An examination of the fundamental principles underlying intellectual property law
 
reveals that, aside from specific issues relating to copyright, the most cogen
t 
justification for the endowment of proprietary rights in respect of a character lies in
 
the protection of the reputation, or goodwill, of that character. This is a convenien
t 
focus because an ~xamination of character merchandising practices reveals that it is
 
the reputation of the character which is invariably used. Injury to a character'
s 
goodwill, or at least the diminuition of financial returns from that goodwill is no
t 
necessarily wrongful as that injury may arguably be competition at work. Thus, when
 
considering whether a character merchandiser's rights are unlawully prejudiced, it is
 
necessary to balance competing factors identified. It is submitted that because
 
additional considerations must be factored into the balancing equation where rea
l 
characters are involved, in order to apply current laws to the modem practice o
f 
character merchandising one should begin by identifying the nature of the characte
r 
involved and then recognise that policy considerations dictate the need to afford
 
different types and extent of protection depending on the nature of the character. 
Earlier in this paper the principles governing the endowment of proprietary rights in
 
respect of characters were canvassed. Granting a "monopoly" to the creator on the
 
basis of the 'natural law' axiom asserted by Libling
82 that any entity generated by the 
expenditure of skill, effort and expertise should be afforded proprietary rights must be
 
balanced against the economic and social needs of free competition. Any approach
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which is based on a 'misappropriation test' and therefore, which does not recognise 
that a distinction should be drawn between characters, overlooks these principles and 
for this reason alone should be dismissed for the purposes of New Zealand law. New 
Zealand law should not protect all intangible elements of value which may flow from 
the exercise by an individual of his or her powers or resources, whether in business or 
by the use of ingenuity, knowledge skill or labour. Some other justifcation is required. 
Undoubtedly the tort of passing off has developed into a flexible structure within 
which the three competing interests identified may be addressed and balanced, 
however it is submitted that for the purposes of New Zealand law a conservative 
approach to the misrepresentation requirement must be taken in contrast to the liberal 
Australian approach. Such a test, based on some 'reasonable likelihood of confusion' 
test or the notion that passing off proscribes any misrepresentation by a trader that its 
product possesses some commercial association (such as, by licence, sponsorship, 
endorsement, or approval with the 'owner' of a character) is consonant with the 
theoretical bases for protection established above and represents an appropriate 
division between · what is regarded as 'pro-competitive' behaviour and 'anti-
competitive behaviour'. It would also mark the boundary of the interests of the owner 
of a character in protecting its reputation. 
While current legislation should, to an extent, be tailored to more adequately meet the 
particular demands of the practice of character merchandising, it is submitted that 
there is no justification for extending common law protection any further. The owner 
of a fictional 'character' does not warrant the granting of proprietary rights outside 
existing causes of action, including copyright and a conservatively applied extended 
passing off action. 
As for the need to provide more protection to the 'real' character, it is submitted that 
New Zealand law should recognise a 'right to publicity' similar to the American 
82 Above n 14. 
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cause of action and ensure that this action remains open for invocation where both the 
images of the real character in its natural capacity and the real character playing the 
fictional character have been misappropriated. The action should lie alongside passing 
off (which would provide protection where a person' s reputation is infringed) and 
would have the effect of recognising a natural person's inherent right to privacy and 
their inherent right to control aspects of his or her image. 
Limits would have to placed on such a cause of action. For example such a right 
should only protect against commercial uses and should not be honoured where there 
is a valid free speech issue such as parody or political comment. Further there should 
be no liability where the appropriation is not an advertisement but comprises purely 
factual matters, the publication of which is in the public interest. If the circumstances 
of the appropriation are such that they would in an action for defamation give rise to 
defences of qualified or absolute privilege or fair comment then a plaintiff should be 
denied a remedy. If the name, likeness or voice which has been appropriated would 
not be recognisable or identifiable by a person of ordinary facilities acquainted with 
the plaintiff or where the appropriation is merely incidental the right should not be 
honoured. 83 In the event that the right is codified, any statute should include fair use 
provisions in line with the Copyright Act 1994 and should expressly exclude purely 
fictional characters of the cartoon type given that their inclusion would have the effect 
of broadening the cause of action to a general one of unfair competition and general 
misappropriation, the ramifications of which have been outlined in the preceding 
analysis. 
It is submitted that, indeed, there are strong arguments in favour of Fisher J' s 
suggestion that a distinction should be drawn in any character merchandising case 
such that real and fictional characters should be treated separately when considering 
whether the particular character merchandising in question merits protection. While 
there are numerous issues to be resolved as to exactly where the line should be drawn, 
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who is to be classified as the 'owner' of the particular images for remedial purposes 
and the nature of the remedies which should be available, an examination of policy 
considerations and of the explanatory power of three different legal models for the 
protection of such a practice does reveal that it is logical and justifiable to advocate 
for the need to distinguish between the types of character in question and afford 
different types and extent of protection against unauthorised use on this basis. 
Undoubtedly, character merchandising is a multi-billion dollar international industry 
and, therefore, it is surprising that to date there have been few character 
merchandising cases brought before New Zealand Courts. It is likely that the number 
of cases will increase and as it does it is submitted that it is imperative that decisions 
are made, or, at the very least, considerations be given to the direction in which the 
law should take . . While evidence can be sought from overseas, particularly from 
Australia and the United States, notice must be taken of the unique circumstances of 
New Zealand - its laws, commercial practices and demography so that an 
overreaction does not occur which could result in the creation of a general action for 
misappropriation which fails to distinguish between types of characters and which 
would provide unjustified protection in many instances. New Zealand Courts must be 
willing to recognise commercial practices without themselves succumbing to the 
realities of marketing strategies. 
83 Above n 67. 
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